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Abstract. The paper presents a cognitive analysis of design as a problem-solving activity. Design is
characterized through results from empirical studies of various design tasks. Based on this
characterization, it will be argued why and how knowledge modeling can be considered as a design
task.
Knowledge modeling has been qualified as the "construction of a set of successive representations".
Processing different types of representations at different levels and from different viewpoints plays an
important role in design problem solving. It will be argued that other characteristics of design may also
apply to knowledge modeling. As there are not yet data available on the cognitive activities involved in
knowledge modeling, hypotheses for studying these activities may be inspired by what is known about
design: design problems have no pre-existing, complete problem definition, and no unique, correct
solution; the design activity does not follow a pre-existing plan, it is opportunistically organized.
Key-words. Design, Knowledge modeling, Problem solving, Ill-defined problem, Cognitive modeling,
Representations, Empirical studies.
Résumé. L'article présente une analyse cognitive de la conception comme activité de résolution de
problème. La conception est caractérisée à travers les résultats d'études empiriques conduites sur
différentes tâches de conception. Sur la base sur cette caractérissation, on présente des arguments pour
défendre pourquoi et comment la modélisation de connaissances peut être considérée comme une
activité de conception.
La modélisation de connaissances a été qualifiée de "construction d'un ensemble de représentations
successives". Le traitement de différents types de représentation de niveaux et de points de vue
différents joue un rôle important dans la résolution de problèmes de conception. On défend que d'autres
caractéristiques de l'activité de conception peuvent s'appliquer également à la modélisation de
connaissances. Parce que l'on ne dispose pas encore de données empiriques sur les activités cognitives
mises en oeuvre dans cette modélisation, on peut formuler des hypothèses à ce sujet à partir de ce que
l'on sait sur la conception: l'absence d'une définition exhaustive, pré-existante du problème et d'une
solution unique ou "correcte", et le fait que l'activité ne suit pas de plan pré-établi, mais est organisé de
façon opportuniste.
Mots-clés. Conception, Modélisation de connaissances, Résolution de problème, Problèmes mal
structurés, Modélisation cognitive, Représentation, Etudes empiriques.
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1. Introduction
Knowledge modeling may be conceived as (a special case of) design. Not only because it involves
design of a system, i.e. a knowledge system, but especially because modeling is an ill-defined problem-
solving task -and one may suppose that this "ill-defined-ness" is not due to the novelty of the task
domain, but is an intrinsic characteristic of the task.
Knowledge modeling has been qualified as the "construction of a set of successive representations"
(Duverger, 1991). Processing different types of representations at different levels and from different
viewpoints is considered to be an important activity involved in design. This paper presents a cognitive
analysis of design as a problem-solving activity. Design will be characterized through the results from
empirical studies conducted on various design tasks. Based on this characterization, it will be argued in
the conclusion why and how knowledge modeling can be considered as a design task.
In what follows, we first present some approaches adopted to design through history (Section 2) and
some theories and definitions proposed by various authors to characterize design (Section 3). Next,
section 4 adopts the analysis of design as a problem-solving task and presents a characterization of
design developed within this framework. In sections 5, 6 and 7, results from several empirical studies
on design in different domains are presented, each one illustrating one of the three main characteristics
of the design activity briefly presented in section 3. Section 8 then closes with a discussion of some
consequences of these results for knowledge modeling as a design task.
2. Different approaches to design through history
In 1984, Cross has brought together a series of design studies from the period between 1962 (year of
the first "Conference on Design Methods", the birthdate of design methodology) and 1982 (the "Design
Policy Conference", the date of coming of age of design methodology) (see Cross, 1984a). The
organization of his book reflects the progression of the "movement" in this domain through four stages:
• prescription of an ideal design process (Part One - The Management of design process; papers
published between 1962 and 1967, the period of "systematic design");
• description of the intrinsic nature of the design activity (Part Two - The Structure of design problems;
1966-1973, the period when design problems were discovered to be not so amenable to
systematization);
• observation of the reality of the design activity (Part Three - The Nature of design activity; a set of
papers all, coincidentally, published in 1979);
• reflection on the fundamental concepts of design (Part Four - The Philosophy of design method;
1972-82).
The present paper focuses on studies describing and modeling "the intrinsic nature of the design
activity", based on observations conducted on real design tasks (it covers of course more recent studies
than those presented in Cross, 1984a).
Visser (1994), focusing on the research conducted on the organization of the activity in design tasks,
also identified four stages in the history of research into this aspect of design: in the first stage, the
terms “hierarchy” or “opportunism” are not relevant, as they had not yet been used; subsequently,
several studies concluded that design was organized in a hierarchical way; in the third stage, the
opportunistic character of design was shown; and recently, several researchers have started to
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investigate more closely the “conflict” between “hierarchy” and “opportunism” (see, below, the section
on the planning of the design activity). Visser (1994), staying within the domain of empirical design
studies, analyzes this development through four stages as a "progression" from modeling design
problem solving in restricted -generally experimental, laboratory- conditions towards models of design
in real-life tasks.
3. Theories and definitions of design
Simon (1969/1981), one of the first authors to formulate a general theory of design, considers design as
"the process of devising artifacts to attain goals". Reitman (1964), another "early" author theorizing on
design problems, focuses on problems involving the "transformation or creation of states, objects or
collections of objects" (represented as a three-component vector [A, B, ->]), and distinguishes six
different types of these problems, according to the specification of A, B and ->: they can be given or
not and, if given, more or less well specified. Design (or its form which Reitman calls a "problem of
creation, invention, or discovering") is characterized by A and -> not being specified, and B being
specified at an abstract level (function + constraints).
In the domain of knowledge-based systems, various authors have proposed categories of problem-
solving tasks and define design through a confrontation with other types of problems or problem
solving.
Generally, these categories have several levels. Hayes-Roth, Hayes-Roth, Rosenschein and Cammarata
(1979), e.g., from a viewpoint of cognitive modeling and Artificial Intelligence, distinguish
interpretation and generation problems. The famous Hearsay-II framework, originally developed for
interpretation problems, is applied in Hayes-Roth et al. (1979) to a generation problem, i.e. planning
(interpreted in Visser, 1994, as design of plans). Despite important differences between the two types
of problems, the framework "appears robust enough to guide solution of both interpretation and
generation problems" (Hayes-Roth et al., 1979, p. 382).
Generation problems are "problems which present the highest level representation (e.g., the goal) and
require generation of the lowest level representation (e.g., the sequence of intended actions)" (ibid.).
"Interpretation and generation problems differ in important ways. For example, interpretation problems
lend themselves well to initial bottom-up strategies, while generation problems lend themselves well to
initial top-down strategies. Interpretation problems generally permit only one (or a small number) of
solutions, while generation problems permit an arbitrary number of different solutions. Further,
interpretation problems typically have correct solutions, while the correctness of solutions to generation
problems varies under different evaluation criteria." (ibid.)
Without reference to these two broad categories, Hayes-Roth, Waterman and Lenat (1983) distinguish
the following types of tasks (for expert systems): interpretation, prediction, diagnosis, design, planning,
monitoring, debugging, repair, instruction, and control. Design is defined as the configuration of
objects under constraints. In the context of the interpretation - generation distinction, it surely would be
considered a generation problem.
Several authors have formulated critiques on the list of tasks given by Hayes-Roth et al. (1983),
especially because the different tasks are not all at the same level. Clancey (1985) introduces "system"
as a central concept: systems can be characterized in terms of their inputs and outputs. Clancey
proposes two large sets of "generic operations" "[doing things] to or with a system": they can construct
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a new system (synthesis) or interpret an existing system (analysis). Design is a construction task and
Clancey distinguishes two types of design task, configuration (characterizing a structure) and planning
(characterizing a process).
In the KADS knowledge elicitation methodology (see Breuker, Wielinga, Someren, Hoog, Schreiber,
Greef, Bredeweg, Wielemaker, Billeaut, Davoodi and Hayward, 1987), the same top-level distinction is
used: system synthesis and system analysis are the major classes in problem-solving tasks. The authors
propose modification tasks as a transition area between these two types of tasks. As in Clancey (1983),
design is conceived as a synthesis task. Here, four types of design are distinguished: hierarchical
design, transformational design, incremental design and multi-stream design. For all synthesis tasks,
the authors adopt "a 2-stage model in which first the informal problem statement is analysed resulting
in a formal specification of the structure to be synthesised, and a subsequent stage in which the
structure is actually created" (p. 91). This decomposition in two distinct, consecutive stages will be
commented on in the next section in a discussion of Simon's (1973/1984) approach to design (but
notice the following remarks on generic task models).
As recalled by Wilson (1989), "task analysis techniques [adopted by the authors using generic task
models for their data collection] divide tasks into components which are usually of pre-specified types.
It is this pre-specification of types of components and the relationships those types can hold which
differentiates descriptions resulting from the use of task analysis techniques from informal descriptions
of tasks in natural language." (p. 202) The analysis presented below yields such "informal descriptions
… in natural language" of design tasks. However, the aspect of design on which these descriptions
differ most from the analyses based on task analysis techniques, i.e. the organization of the activity, has
led to several formal descriptions and (proposals for) design models (see Davies, 1991; Rist, 1991;
Visser, 1990). One of the causes of this difference is the use of interviews which is one of the most
frequent knowledge elicitation techniques employed in task analysis (see also the section on Empirical
design studies in Visser, 1992). Interviews are indeed known to be rather inappropriate for the
acquisition of knowledge on (expert) strategies which is -relatively best- obtained by protocol analysis
techniques (cf. Cordingley, 1989; Nwana, 1992).
One should remember, however, that the task performed by a knowledge-based system (KBS) is not
the same as that performed by the expert whose knowledge has been used to design this system! The
knowledge engineer indeed models the knowledge of the expert with a particular objective -the design
of a KBS, he does not pretend to "simulate the mind of the expert" (Duverger, 1991).
4. Design and other types of problem solving
This paper presents a cognitive-psychology approach to design. In cognitive psychology, most authors
have also characterized design by considering it as a problem-solving activity and comparing it with
other types of problem solving.
Hoc (1988) presents a distinction between state transformation, structure induction and design
problems: design consists in detailing a laconic, insufficiently detailed and inappropriate representation
of the goal state into an appropriate representation.
Various authors have opposed "ill-defined" (or "ill-structured") and "well-defined" (or "well-
structured") problems: design problems are of the first type, whereas the problems classically examined
in psychological studies are of the second type.
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Both Simon (1969/1981) and Reitman (1964) use this distinction (see also Eastman, 1969; Voss and
Post, 1988). Reitman (1964) considers that there is a continuum ranging from well-defined formal
problems to ill-defined empirical problems such as the design problem of composing a fugue, analyzed
by him in great detail (cf. Reitman, 1965). He relates this continuum to the idea of ambiguity of a
problem (i.e. the fact that, over a specified community of problem-solvers, there is little or no
agreement regarding the referents of the problem attributes, permissible operations, and their
consequences). A consequence of this is that solutions to ill-defined problems are not correct or
incorrect, but more or less accepted.
Thomas and Carroll (1979/1984) propose to consider designing, not as a form of problem solving
particular to "the class" of "ill-defined problems", but rather as a way of "looking at" a problem. A
problem is not defined by its "objective" characteristics, but depends on its representation constructed
by the problem solver. As put forward in Visser (1994), "rather than characterizing a particular task as
a 'problem', independently of a subject (designer) or other cognitive system confronted with this task,
we consider that a problem only exists relative to a subject (see Hoc, 1988; Mayer, 1989). Defining 'a
situation [as] a functional system constituted by a task and a subject' (Leplat and Hoc, 1983, p. 49), a
situation constitutes a 'problem' -or not- for a particular subject depending on the representation this
subject constructs of her or his task."
This position could be judged similar to Simon's (1973/1984) analysis of the "elusiveness" of a
problem's structure: "definiteness of problem structure is largely an illusion that arises when we
systematically confound the idealized problem that is presented to an idealized (and unlimitedly
powerful) problem-solver with the actual problem that is attacked by a problem-solver with limited
(even if large) computational capacities" (p. 150). Simon considers, however, that -in a first stage- an
ill-structured problem can be structured, and that -in a second stage- solving the resulting well-
structured problem requires only a fraction of problem-solving effort. The idea defended here is that
there are not two consecutive stages: first structuring the problem, and then solving it, but that -if two
such processes can be distinguished- they are intertwined during the entire problem-solving process
until a final solution is proposed.
The presentation given below of design problems and design problem solving should therefore not be
interpreted as reflecting the position that design problems can be characterized independently of the
activity of their solver. It simply focuses consecutively on only analytically distinguishable aspects:
first on static, representational, next on dynamic, processing aspects.
A design problem, as it is considered by the designer,
• is not defined in the initial problem specifications, i.e. is not specified completely and unambiguously
right from the start, when the designer receives the specifications (from the client) (cf. the definition
given by Hoc, 1988);
• can be solved, more or less satisfactorily, by several solutions, rather than by just one "correct"
solution: there is no "definite criterion for testing any proposed solution" (Simon, 1973/1984, p. 146),
such as there typically exists for "well-defined" problems: design problem solutions are more or less
"acceptable" or "satisfying", they are not either "correct" or "incorrect".
In an analysis of problems in the social sciences, Voss, Greene, Post and Penner (1983) attribute this
characteristic to the fact that "the solvers of the community are not in agreement with respect to the
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appropriate solutions" (p. 263) (cf. Reitman's ideas, presented above, on the varying ambiguity of
problems). Voss et al. (1983) refer to Tweney (1981) for "evidence [suggesting] that the solving of [the
physics problems in new research areas] highly resembles the solving of the political science problems"
(ibid.). Due to this incomplete and ambiguous character of the problem requirements, the solution
evaluation criteria are also ill-defined.
Designers, in order to solve a design problem,
• have to specify, and possibly modify, the problem constraints in the problem specifications; if -as is
often the case- there are conflicting constraints in the initial problem specifications, these conflicts are
to be resolved;
• need to construct and use representations of the "same" object at different abstraction levels and
considered from different viewpoints (e.g., conceptual, functional, physical);
• need to possess -because they need to use- knowledge in different domains (e.g., design methods;
knowledge in the "application" domain, such as mechanics or aerospace structures in composite
material);
• cannot follow, in general, a pre-established plan or procedure (such as, to process the different levels
or viewpoints in a particular order: for example, top-down, breadth-first, first the conceptual, then the
functional, and finally the physical viewpoint).
To sum up: design tasks may be characterized by the following qualifications of the problem, the
activity to solve it, and the solution to be developed:
• the problem to be solved is not completely and immutably specified from the outset: an important part
of the engineer's activity consists of constraining this problem;
• this activity does not follow a pre-existing plan;
• the solution to be obtained is not unique: the "final" specifications arrived at by a designer may be
modified, not because they are "incorrect", but because an alternative design may be chosen by another
designer, using different criteria (cf., for these three characteristics, the Hayes-Roth et al., 1979,
definition of generation problems quoted above).
In the last section of this paper, these characteristics of design will be used in the discussion of
knowledge modeling as a design task. The following section will detail them through the examples of
empirical studies conducted on different design tasks.
5. Evolution of the design representation throughout the problem-solving process
Solving a design problem consists in transforming one problem representation into another, generally
via intermediate representations.
First, design always starts with "requirements" and produces "specifications" (see Visser, 1990).
Differences of, at least, two types characterize these two problem representations:
• domain (or viewpoint): the representation domains of both representations differ;
• level: the first representation is at a more abstract level than the second (i.e. is less complete, less
precise and less concrete than the second).
In software design, e.g., a specifications representation using concepts in the application domain is to
be transformed into computer specifications represented in the software domain. In mechanical design,
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going from the client's requirements to the working drawings, three consecutive representation stages
may be distinguished, which are, however, not necessarily handled in this order (see below):
• representation of the goal to be attained by the artifact to be designed (or its function);
• representation of the mechanical operations which will allow this goal to be attained (to realize this
function);
• representation of the machines or tools which are going to physically bring about these operations.
For each couple of consecutive representations, the first defines the requirements for the second (cf.
Dasgupta, 1989, pp. 48-49).
The client's requirements, i.e. the specifications of a design problem presented at the outset, are rarely
complete and/or stable. Generally client and designer(s) discuss them to arrive at a specification
worked out in common (cf. Malhotra, Thomas, Carroll and Miller, 1980); but even the problem as
defined in the legal documents resulting from this is subject to modifications: an important part of a
designer's activity consists of developing, especially constraining, the problem.
Levels and/or viewpoints of representation. First, the design is developed in greater and greater detail:
first defined in terms of a global goal to be achieved, it is progressively characterized to become
sufficiently precise as to specify the realization of the target object.
Second, the design is developed from the viewpoint of different types of representation which are all to
be taken into account in the design: e.g., functional, structural, topological, material / physical,
financial. In a detailed analysis of protocols from computer network designers, Darses (1992)
distinguishes five different viewpoints (types of constraints) from which the network problem is
analyzed by the designers: initial required data, abstracted data, functional data, conceptual data and
physical data. A designer does not necessarily analyze all problem components (or sub-problems) from
all different viewpoints. Neither does the analysis of a problem pass in a fixed order through the
different viewpoints -that is why a qualification in terms of "levels" does not seem appropriate here.
Darses (1992) describes the network design activity in terms of constraint satisfaction. Constraints are
specified and developed. Darses presents several cognitive mechanisms used by designers for
constraint management: constraints are propagated through the different viewpoints presented above;
the propagation network which may become enormous can be reduced by compacting the constraints;
plans, schemata and prototypes are proposed as knowledge representation formats which contain
information used in marking out the direction adopted by constraint propagation.
6. The activity does not follow a pre-existing plan: design is opportunistically organized
Early design studies tended to "conflate prescriptive and descriptive remarks" on the activity, and,
rather than to consider what the activity is really like, to focus on what it should be (see Carroll and
Rosson, 1985; Cross 1984b). This led authors to describe design as being well structured and even as
hierarchically organized. The design process as implemented by human designers, however, does not
have a neatly organized structure of consecutive stages, such as advocated or laid down by design
methodologies (cf., for engineering design, the ASE-paradigm proposed by Jones, 1963/1984, and its
corresponding form in software engineering, i.e. the waterfall model). For a critical review of such
methods, see Carroll and Rosson (1985), Cross (1984b), Dasgupta (1989, pp. 31-33), Visser and Hoc
(1990).
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Using data obtained for both individual designers and a group of designers working together on a
design project, Visser (1988) argues why normative or prescriptive design models do not account for
the human design activity (Visser, 1990, presents the detailed data for an individual mechanical
designer working on a functional-specifications task).
As has been shown in empirical studies conducted on various types of design tasks, the design activity
is quite different from the one presented in normative or descriptive theoretical models. It appears to be
non-hierarchical: processing is neither completely top-down, nor totally bottom-up; it proceeds in a
cyclical manner, introducing new goals as it goes along (see Visser, 1994).
Designers may describe their activity in the form of a hierarchically structured plan. This plan,
however, does not represent the designer's actual activity which has, in fact, an opportunistic
organization. Designers use such plans, but, as claimed by Visser (1994), even for experts involved in
routine design, retrieval of preexisting plans does not appropriately characterize the organization of
their activity. Underlying Visser's claim is the idea (based on data from various studies conducted on
real design tasks reviewed in her paper) that designers may often find it profitable to deviate from these
plans. Indeed,
• even if they can and, in fact, do retrieve a known solution plan for their design problem (which may
be possible in routine design, as shown by several studies),
• yet if they evaluate the cost of their possible actions (“cognitive” and other costs), as they will do in
real design,
• the action selected for execution will often be an action other than the one proposed by the plan.
The hierarchical plan is -temporarily- abandoned as
• the design of components is interrupted before it is completed,
• addenda and other modifications are made on components that have already been dealt with,
• components are anticipated, as they are dealt with before "their turn (according to the plan)".
Modifications may range from correcting errors to challenging design decisions (see Visser, 1988,
1990).
7. Not one correct solution, but various more or less acceptable solutions
In a study of traffic-signal setting technicians, Bisseret, Figeac-Létang and Falzon (1988) observed six
expert designers solving the same problem. Each produced a different solution. Not only were the final
results different, also the approaches used to achieve these solutions were different.
Bonnardel (1991) studied cognitive aspects of the evaluation process in design of aerospace structures.
In an experimental study, she asked designers -experts and novices- to evaluate different problem-
solution pairs and to select for each problem the solution they judged the best. Not only did different
designers select different solutions; each designer also chose different solutions ( two or three rather
than one): the final choice between these two or three solutions would depend, they said, upon the final
importance of a particular criterion. The level of expertise had no effect on the designers' choice. The
differences in choice depended on the different priority which each accorded to certain criteria related
to a particular characteristic of the aerospace structure (its material).
8. Conclusion
In the introduction, knowledge modeling was presented as a type of design. We have characterized it as
an ill-defined problem-solving task. The present paper has detailed a certain number of characteristics
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of design: solving a design problem consists in transforming one problem representation into another,
design problems do not have one, correct solution, and design is opportunistically organized. These
three characteristics apply indeed to knowledge modeling.
The expert's knowledge structures which the designers of knowledge systems (knowledge engineers)
take as the input for their models are not given and well-defined at the start. Guided by hypotheses
about these structures, their organization and their use, a knowledge engineer will have to make choices
and decisions -which may be different from those adopted by a colleague, without one or the other
being "incorrect" or even "less correct".
Knowledge modeling involves the construction of a set of successive representations. The development
of methodologies such as KADS or KAKE may provide unified frameworks guiding the construction
of these different representations, but the nature and type of the representations (models) constructed
will still differ between different designers.
Even if there are no empirical data with respect to the organization of the cognitive activity involved in
knowledge modeling, one may suppose that the conclusion based on empirical studies conducted on
other types of design tasks also applies to this task: an ill-defined problem solving activity such as
knowledge modeling does not follow a pre-existing plan, it is opportunistically organized as are other
design tasks. This conclusion may be particularly valid for the middle stages of the task -accepting the
abstraction adopted with respect to the real activity if using the "stages" approach. Data gathering -the
first stage- and the design and implementation of the system -the last stage- might perhaps be rather
well structured and organized -at least on paper or in the methodology handbook (cf. the remarks on the
conflation between prescriptive and descriptive approaches). The main part of the task, however, i.e.
the creation of different models of the expert's knowledge structures, will remain, in essence, an ill-
defined task which cannot proceed according to a pre-established plan.
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